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Introduction
In many interesting settings, a period of conict or competition between groups is followed by the opportunity for mutually benecial cooperation between the same groups.
Examples include the formation of a coalition government following an election, the integration of work teams following a corporate merger, and the reunication of a nation after a period of civil conict. In such situations, individuals are faced with a choice between acting in their own self-interest, in the parochial interests of their in-group, or in the collective interests of all parties.
If, as a result of the prior history of conict, individuals are reluctant to cooperate with members of an out-group, the result may be substantial eciency losses to society as a whole. Yet, at the same time, a shared experience of conict may also reinforce cooperative norms among members of an in-group. To give an extreme example: two decades after the wars in the Balkans, Muslims and Christians in Bosnia have established separate schools and even separate re departments (Brunwasser, 2011) . This clearly illustrates these groups' preference to invest in local public goods that only benet members of their in-group, as opposed to global public goods that benet all parties.
There are several possible reasons why conict may inhibit subsequent cooperation between groups. Firstly, the underlying reasons for the conict could also have an eect on cooperation. Secondly, conict could create or deepen in-group identity, strengthening other-regarding preferences toward in-group members and making it more attractive to cooperate within groups. Finally, conict may create animosity towards out-group members, eroding other-regarding preferences towards out-group members and making it less attractive to cooperate between groups.
In this paper, we report a laboratory experiment designed to study how cooperative behavior, both within and between groups, is inuenced by the group members' experience of a prior phase of conict. In particular, we compare levels of within-and between-group cooperation in the situation described above where the same two groups were previously in conict to a comparable situation in which each group previously experienced conict involving a dierent out-group, as well as when group members have no prior experience of conict. We vary this group matching on a between-subjects basis.
Since exposure to conict is exogenous and randomly-assigned in our experiment, we can set aside the rst explanation namely that conict and cooperation share some common and deeper source. Our group matching manipulations then enable us to disentangle the latter two mechanisms, to independently identify the eects of a shared experience of conict upon other-regarding preferences toward members of the in-and out-groups.
Our instrument for measuring cooperation within-and between-groups is a multi-level public good (MLPG) game (Blackwell and McKee, 2003) . In this game, all individuals have an endowment which they can retain for private consumption, contribute to a local public good that benets only members of the in-group, and/or a global public good that benets members of both the in-and out-groups. Our conict manipulation takes the form of an inter-group version of the Tullock rent-seeking contest, in which groups compete over a xed resource through socially wasteful spending (Tullock, 1980; Abbink et al., 2010) . The Tullock game thus models a prior phase of inter-group conict which is followed by a subsequent opportunity for cooperation in the form of the MLPG game.
Previous studies of the MLPG game typically nd that contributions to the global public good are increasing in the relative return on the global account compared to the local one (Blackwell and McKee, 2003; Fellner and Lünser, 2008; Chakravarty and Fonseca, 2013) . However, since the Tullock contest potentially induces a much stronger form of in-and out-group identity than has previously been considered in this literature, this responsiveness to eciency considerations may not be robust to a shared history of conict involving the same out-group. For this reason, we vary the return on contributions to the global public good as a second dimension of our experiment design.
Our approach thus introduces a number of methodological innovations. Firstly, we go beyond standard arbitrary or minimal methods of group formation, by using inter-group competition in a Tullock contest to instill a much stronger form of induced group identity forged in conict against another group in the laboratory. Secondly, through our manipulations of group matching across the two phases of our experiment, we are able to disentangle the in-and out-group eects of this conict manipulation upon subsequent interactions in the MLPG game.
Our results are directionally consistent with a simple model of other-regarding preferences in which conict increases the utility weight on payos for members of the in-group, while decreasing the weight on payos of the out-group. We nd that within-group cooperation increases when groups have a shared history of conict compared to when they play the MLPG without any prior history, while between-group cooperation diminishes when two groups have previously been in conict. We nd no signicant response to an increase in the return to between-group cooperation when there has been a prior history of conict between the groups which is contrary to the results of previous studies that induce weaker forms of group identity. On the other hand, when two groups have not previously interacted (but each has nonetheless previously experienced conict involving a dierent out-group) we nd a signicant increase in between-group cooperation in response to an increase in its return which is in line with the results of the previous literature.
The paper proceeds by reviewing the relevant literature in Section 2, before Section 3 sets out our experimental design. Section 4 develops a simple model of other-regarding preferences in the MLPG game, from which we derive hypotheses regarding the eects of our treatments. Section 5 presents and discusses our results, and Section 6 concludes.
Related literature
Our paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, we make a methodological contribution to the literature on inducing group identity in laboratory experiments. The most widely used method of doing so, the minimal group paradigm introduced by Tajfel (1971) in the social psychology literature, involves forming groups on the basis of seemingly irrelevant personal characteristics such as preference for a particular abstract painting by either Klee or Kandinsky and has been found to be sucient to induce a bias in favor of members of the in-group in many psychological experiments (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) . This method has also been widely applied in economic experiments, although usually in a modied form.
1 In these studies, assigning group membership randomly according to number or color, or according to trivial preferences, has not always been sucient to induce an in-group bias. However, using these procedures in a modied form, and/or in combination with other methods designed to increase the salience of group membership, has been found to be eective.
One notable example is Chen and Li (2009) , who use the Klee/Kandinsky procedure and nd that subjects are more likely to choose social-welfare maximizing actions in allocation games when playing with in-group members. In their setting, shared identity deriving from a trivial preference for one painter over another is only eective in producing differences in behavior toward in-and out-group members when combined with anonymous communication with the in-group members during a problem-solving task. Similarly, Charness et al. (2007) nd that in-group preferences are stronger when an individual's choices are observed (passively) by in-group members, whereas arbitrarily labeling groups and identifying them with colors or numbers is not enough to create an in-group bias in Prisoner's Dilemma and battle-of-the-sexes games. Eckel and Grossman (2005) compare the eects of several methods for creating group identity in a laboratory experiment, comparing cooperation in a public good game played under various degrees of induced group identity, including arbitrary group identity (in which groups are formed randomly then labeled by color only), as well as treatments in which identity is strengthened through joint participation in problem-solving tasks, and 1 As Chen and Li (2009) point out, the classic denition of the minimal group paradigm requires that any decisions made by a subject should not directly aect her own payo. However this condition is violated in most economic experiments that use similar methods to induce group identity in the lab. competition in a tournament (in which the group with the highest contribution to the public good receives a bonus which is deducted from the losing team's payos). They nd that in-group cooperation is not aected by the arbitrary or problem-solving treatments, but is signicantly higher when teams have participated in the tournament.
Our approach is similar to Eckel and Grossman (2005) in that we use competition as a means of making group identity more salient. However, our design diers in two key respects. First, we are able to examine and compare the eect of this group identity not only on in-group cooperation after competition, but also on cooperation with an outgroup. Second, we strengthen group identity through competition that produces a social loss, which may cause a dierent change in preferences than productive competition.
Our design uses a Tullock contest (Tullock, 1980) in which two parties choose how much to invest in (wasteful) competition over a xed resource to increase the salience of group membership. The Tullock contest is a simple model of rent seeking and a natural workhorse for experimental studies on conict (Abbink, 2012) . In the Tullock game, although any expenditure on competition is inherently socially inecient, the equilibrium level of investment is positive. In previous experiments, investments in the contest have far exceeded equilibrium predictions (see Sheremeta (2013) for a survey).
Moreover, playing the Tullock game in a group environment seems to matter : Abbink et al. (2010) nd that investments in a the contest are even further above the equilibrium prediction when the game is played in teams rather than individually. Ke et al. (2013) use a Tullock game in which two subjects compete together as an alliance against a third individual to study how behavior changes when the alliance members know that they will later compete against one another in a second stage competition over the spoils from the rst stage. They nd that any solidarity formed during the rst stage does not diminish the intensity of conict in the second contest, when the former alliance members compete against one another. Although behavior in ad hoc alliances is closely related to the way in which we study the eect of the Tullock game in creating group identity, our design diers from Ke et al. (2013) in an important way: groups in our experiment compete in the contest without any expectation of competing against team members in the future, and thus their experience in the competition is plausibly of dierent character. Our study is the rst we are aware of to employ the Tullock game as a means of creating group identity that is salient in a subsequent and unrelated task. Halevy et al. (2012) also examine how changes in incentives for intra-group competition aect subsequent interactions. Individuals can choose to cooperate with their in-group while simultaneously harming the out-group, and after a set number of rounds some individuals are given the option to cooperate with their in-group without harming the out-group. The authors nd that individuals prefer to cooperate with in-group members without imposing negative externalities on the out-group, and this is true even after a phase of conict in which in-group cooperation is necessarily associated with negative externalities, resulting in high rates of harm to the out-group.
Our study is similar to these experiments in that we are concerned with how conict between groups aects subsequent interactions. However, we study an environment in which incentives favor conict in the rst phase, and then observe how this aects cooperation between groups (as opposed to further competition) in a second phase.
This brings us to the second body of literature to which our paper contributes, on cooperation within and between groups including both groups formed endogenously in the naturally-occurring world as well as ones formed in the lab. Findings from a number of economic experiments show that group membership leads to more within-group cooperation (Puurtinen and Mappes, 2009 ), but decreases between-group cooperation.
Therefore, stronger group identity may lead to eciency gains due to increased withingroup cooperation, but eciency losses associated with reduced out-group cooperation.
Several papers use MLPG experiments to study inter-group interactions, generally nding that although subjects contribute non-zero amounts to the local public good, contributions to the global public good are higher, and responsive to its relative eciency. Blackwell and McKee (2003) use arbitrary group identity groups are formed randomly and identied by color and nd weak evidence for in-group preferences, but only when the average per-capita return to the global public good is no lower than that of the local public good. Fellner and Lünser (2008) study a similar experiment, identifying groups by letters and adding a monitoring mechanism to increase the salience of group identity.
They nd that contributions to the global public good are high when it is socially more ecient than the local public good, but that as cooperation decays over time, subjects switch toward the local public good. Chakravarty and Fonseca (2013) assign subjects into groups using the Klee/Kandinsky procedure, and strengthen group identity using intra-group communication (through a chat-box on the computer screen, as in Chen and Li (2009) ) before an MLPG game in which the eciency of the local public good is varied across treatments. They nd that even when the nancial return to investing in the global public good is higher, subjects invest a considerable part of their endowment in the local (club) good, hence reducing social eciency. One possible reason for the somewhat stronger results of this study may be that it induces a more salient form of group identity than the two previous studies.
In addition to laboratory experiments, there are also a number of artefactual eld experiments which measure the eects of naturally-occurring group identity on within-and between-group cooperation.
In a cross-cultural experiment, Buchan et al. (2009) use an adaption of the MLPG game in which contributions to the local and global public goods do not directly aect current players, but instead accrue to individuals playing in a subsequent session and nd that increased exposure to globalization at both the individual and national level increases contributions to a global account that also accrues to citizens of other countries.
The MLPG design allows them to separate preferences for cooperating with foreigners specically from general variation in preferences for cooperation between countries.
The eld experiment most closely related to our paper is Gumen (2012) , who studies a variation of the MLPG game using students from fraternities at a US university.
2 Groups of subjects from the same fraternity are matched with an out-group either from the same fraternity or from a rival fraternity, according to treatment. She nds that when subjects play with an out-group from the same fraternity, they over-invest in the global public good. However, when playing with an out-group from a rival fraternity, they invest comparatively more in the local public good.
In addition to material incentives, inter-group interactions may be motivated by preferences for cooperation within groups and competition between groups (Hirshleifer, 1995) , which may have developed through evolutionary conditions that involved frequent conict between small groups (Bowles and Gintis, 2011) . Choi and Bowles (2007) hypothesize that war is instrumental in maintaining and strengthening parochial altruism (increased altruism towards in-group members coupled with hostility towards out-group members).
In line with this theoretical prediction, recent empirical evidence on the eects of war on social preferences shows that war leads to more altruism towards neighbors (Voors et al., 2012) , stronger egalitarian norms towards in-group members by children (Bauer et al., 2014) , and more within-group cooperation (Gneezy and Fessler, 2012) .
Our study is related to this literature, but focuses on the role that simple conict in the form competition over a xed resource as distinct from exposure to violence or other trauma plays in shaping social preferences. We contribute to the discussion of group identity and cooperation by disentangling how conict aects other-regarding preferences toward the in-and out-groups, using competition in the Tullock contest as novel means of inducing group identity in the laboratory.
2 In Gumen's design, the payo function is non-linear, with an interior optimum for a selsh agent.
Design
Our experiment consists of two stages: a group Tullock contest and an MLPG game, both of which are played between two groups of three subjects in each of our treatments.
Groups are formed randomly and anonymously at the beginning of the session, and the membership of a subject's in-group remains the same throughout the experiment. In each stage, each group is paired with a second group (the out-group) for ten rounds of repeated play, with one round of each game randomly selected to count for payment at the end of the experiment. The identity of the out-group remains constant across all ten rounds of a given game. However, it may change between games according to treatment.
We use the Tullock contest primarily to manipulate subjects' experience of conict both as a member of their in-group, and in opposition to an out-group. We use the MLPG game to measure the eect of these conict manipulations upon subjects' willingness to cooperate both within their in-group as well as between the in-and out-groups. In particular, in our arbitrary-groups treatment, subjects play the MLPG game as the rst stage of the experiment, without any prior experience of the Tullock contest. In this treatment, subjects play the MLPG game without any previous history of interaction with the members of their in-or out-groups. This treatment thus constitutes a baseline measure of cooperativeness in the absence of any interaction history.
In our rematched-groups treatments, subjects play the Tullock contest as the rst stage.
However, they are rematched with a new out-group before playing the MLPG game. In these treatments, subjects have previously interacted with the other members of their in-group, but not the out-group, prior to playing the MLPG game. This enables us to identify the eect of the experience of conict in potentially strengthening other-regarding preferences toward members of the in-group. Finally in our xed-groups treatments, subjects play the Tullock contest rst, and are then paired with the same out-group for the MLPG game. As a result, they have previously interacted with both their in-and out-groups prior to playing the MLPG game. This enables us to identify the eect of the experience of conict in weakening other-regarding preferences toward the out-group.
In addition, in our xed-and rematched-groups treatments, we also vary the return on cooperation between groups in the MLPG game, in the form of the marginal per-capita return (M P CR) on contributions to the global account that benets the members of both the in-and out-groups. We do this to study how our conict manipulations inuence the extent to which subjects respond to eciency considerations.
Tullock contest
The Tullock contest (Tullock, 1980) models an unproductive conict between two parties over an exogenous prize P . In our implementation of this game, we take each group to be a party to the contest, with the prize to be contested between two groups and then divided equally among the three members of the winning group. In each round, each group has an endowment y, and must choose an amount x to invest in its contest fund to increase its chances of winning the prize. Given the investments of the two groups, x g and x h , the probability that group g is the winner is given by:
and the expected payo to group g in a given round of the game is:
The Tullock game has a unique equilibrium (in terms of total group investments) which can be found by taking the rst-order condition of Π g with respect to x g and setting x g = x h = x * such that each group invests x * = P/4 in its respective contest fund.
We give each group an aggregate endowment of y = 300, and the two groups compete over a prize of the same value (i.e. P = 300), implying an equilibrium investment of x * = 75 for each group. Since the prize is split equally among members of the winning group, each group member receives P/3 = 100 in the event that their group is the winner.
We determine investments in the group contest fund using a median-voter rule. Each group member is given an endowment of y i = y/3 = 100, and is obliged to invest the median of the amounts proposed by the three members of their in-group, with no possibility to free-ride. In equilibrium, each individual's share of the group investment is thus
Under the median-voter rule, no individual has any incentive to deviate from proposing their true preferred level of investment, even when this diers from the risk-neutral Nash investment for example as a result of social or risk preferences. The median-voter rule does, however, change the nature of the group Tullock game, by prohibiting free-riding and forcing some subjects to contribute an amount greater or less than their preferred amount, and this element of our design represents a deviation from previous group Tullock games (such as Abbink et al. (2010) ). We have several reasons for this modication. If subjects were individually free to choose any desired contribution to their group's contest fund, high contributions would likely be considered an altruistic act beneting the group.
Dierences between group members' contributions would also create wealth eects within groups, and each of these factors could plausibly inuence cooperation in the MLPG game. The median voter rule allows us to better isolate the role of conict in forming group identity. Moreover, it is also arguably closer to many naturally occurring conicts.
When a country goes to war, for example, leaders determine both the overall tax rate and the portion of total government resources invested in conict, and while individuals have opportunities to voluntarily contribute additional resources to the eort, the level of overall investment is largely determined at the group level.
In each round, before the draw to determine the winning group occurs, subjects receive feedback on the median investment proposed by the members of their own group, the resulting allocation of their group to the contest fund, the allocation of the rival group, and their group's resultant probability of being the winner. After this, the draw to determine the winner takes place and subjects are informed of the result before continuing to the next round.
Multi-level public good game
In the MLPG game, each subject is given an individual endowment of ω i = 100 in each round. Each subject must decide how to allocate this endowment between three accounts: a private account that benets the individual alone, a local public good that benets the three members of the in-group only, and a global public good that benets six individuals:
the three members of the in-group as well as the three members of the out-group with whom they have been matched. In the instructions, these three alternatives are framed neutrally as accounts A, B and C.
Given the contribution decisions of all six players, the monetary payo to individual i in any given round of the game is:
where c i denotes a contribution to the local public good that benets the n = 3 members of the in-group and C i denotes a contribution to the global public good that benets the 2n = 6 members of both the in-and out-groups.
Allocations to the private account always yield a return of 1, accruing to the individual alone. In all treatments, the sum of contributions to the local public good, by all three members of the in-group, is multiplied by a factor of α = 1.5 and divided equally between them, giving an M P CR from the local account of α/n = 0.5.
Similarly, the sum of contributions to the global public good, by all six members of the inand out-groups, is multiplied by a factor of β and divided equally between them. We vary the return to the global account between treatments. In our low-gains-from-cooperation treatments we set β = 2, giving an M P CR on the global account of β/2n = 0.33, while in our high-gains treatments we set β = 3, giving an M P CR of β/2n = 0.5.
Since β/2n ≤ α/n < 1 in all treatments, an individual who cares only about her own material payo will contribute nothing to either of the public goods, just as in a standard (single-level) public good game. On the other hand, since β > α > 1 in all treatments, full contribution to the global account is always the most socially ecient outcome.
Treatments
By manipulating the nature of the prior group interactions (if any) before the play of the MLPG game, we are able to identify the eect that exposure to inter-group conict, involving either the same or a dierent out-group, has upon preferences for both intraand inter-group cooperation, and thus examine how subjects' other-regarding preferences are shaped by the experience of conict. Moreover, by manipulating the gains from cooperating with the out-group as well, we are also able to measure the response to eciency considerations, and in particular whether this diers between treatments in which subjects are exposed to the same, or to a dierent, out-group in the MLPG game.
In total, we have ve treatments in a (2 × 2)+1 design. Firstly, we interact the dimension of xed-versus rematched-groups with that of low versus high gains from cooperation. This results in four treatments: xed groups with low / high gains from cooperation (FL and FH, respectively) and rematched groups with low / high gains from cooperation (RL and RH, respectively) . In these four treatments, the Tullock contest is played as the rst stage to induce a prior experience of conict before playing the MLPG game.
In addition, we also include an arbitrary groups with low gains from cooperation treatment (AL), in which subjects play the MLPG game rst (with low gains from cooperation) without any prior interaction with either their in-or out-groups, and then play the Tullock contest second (in a xed group matching). This AL treatment captures baseline levels of cooperation with no prior experience of conict as a group.
Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the Laboratory of Experimental Economics in Prague, Czech Republic between April 2012 and October 2013. We collected data for ten group pairs (with six subjects each) of the MLPG game in each of the ve treatments. Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004 ) from a pool of students who had registered to participate in economic experiments. A total of 300 subjects took part in the experiment.
Of these, 57% were undergraduates and 69% were males.
The experiment was conducted entirely in English.
3 Sessions were conducted with 12-30 subjects at one time, and lasted around 75 minutes. All subjects in any given session were assigned to the same treatment. Two experimenters were present for each session, with the instructions read aloud by the same experimenter in all but one of the sessions.
The experiment software was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) .
Upon entering the lab, subjects were randomly assigned to a computer terminal, and instructions were both read aloud and provided in print.
4 At the beginning of the session, subjects were informed that they would complete two tasks, but they were not told anything about the second task until after they had completed the rst one. Subjects were told that they would be matched into groups, and that these groups would remain anonymous both during and after the experiment.
In all treatments except for AL, the Tullock contest was played rst, followed by the MLPG game. The instructions for the rst game were read, and then subjects answered a series of control questions to ensure that they understood the task. After completing the rst game, subjects were told that they would continue to the second task, and a similar procedure was followed again. The instructions clearly stated whether the outgroup matching was the same or dierent from the rst task (according to the treatment), and that the composition of the in-group would remain unchanged across both tasks.
Each subject was paid for one round of the Tullock contest and one round of the MLPG game, chosen at random after both games had been completed. All payments were made in private; the average payment per subject was 250 CZK, which was equivalent to approximately $13 USD at the time of the experiment.
3 The invitations to participate indicated clearly that the experiment would be conducted in English. All subjects completed a series of control questions (also in English) which serves to conrm that they were procient enough in English to understand the instructions. 4 The instructions for treatment RL are available online as Appendix B.
4 Theory
Model
We now develop our hypotheses regarding the eects of our treatments upon the level of contributions to the local and global public goods in the MLPG game. We motivate these hypotheses with a very simple reduced-form model of other-regarding preferences.
In particular we allow for the possibility that an agent may, in addition to their own material payos, attach some weight to the payos of others in the utility function.
At the same time, we allow for the possibility that the agent may distinguish between members of the in-and out-groups in the weights that they assign to the payos of others.
Thus, let a denote the value that an agent attaches to an extra unit of payo to another member of the in-group, relative to a unit of own payo, and let b denote the weight attached to an extra unit of payo to a member of the out-group. In reality, a and b
are latent taste parameters that are heterogeneous across the population. However, for concreteness we speak of the eects of our treatments upon the tastes of a representative agent. We assume at minimum that a, b ∈ (−1, 1), with a ≥ b. Then, taking into account the eect of contributions to the local and global public goods upon the payos of others, we augment the material payo function (3) to write the utility function as:
In our experiment design, α = 1.5 and n = 3 are xed, β is varied as a treatment variable in our low and high gains from cooperation conditions, and we hypothesize that our arbitrary, rematched and xed group assignment conditions will shift the other-regarding preference parameters a and b in a manner that we describe below.
Given the linear specication of the payo and utility functions, this model generates the highly stylized point prediction that an agent should always contribute fully to whichever account yields the highest marginal benet respectively 1, 0.5 (1 + 2a), and β 6 (1 + 2a + 3b) for the private, local and global accounts. Figure 1 depicts the parameter congurations of a and b for which it is optimal to contribute to the private (red, lower left), local (blue, lower right) and global (green, upper right) accounts respectively. We depict these for the case of β = 2 in the left-hand panel, and for β = 3 on the right.
While our model clearly oversimplies in predicting only boundary allocations, it serves to generate some useful intuition which we illustrate with reference to some special cases. 5 Clearly, equation (4) omits payos that others derive from allocations to their own private accounts. We do this to focus on the indirect, but partial, eects of an agent's own contributions to the local and global public goods upon their own utility. That is, we do not claim to provide a full equilibrium model. Firstly, for the case of a purely selsh agent with a = b = 0, the model yields the standard prediction that own material payos are maximized by allocating the entire endowment to the private account and contributing nothing to either the local or global public goods.
Secondly, consider the case a > b = 0 in which an agent assigns positive weight to the payos of other members of the in-group, but is indierent to the payos of the out-group.
This corresponds to points along the horizontal axis in Figure 1 . In this case, the agent will contribute to a public good if they are suciently regarding of the other members of the in-group, i.e. if a > 0.5. Then, for β = 2 it is optimal to contribute fully to the local account, while for β = 3 the agent is indierent between the local and global accounts.
Thirdly, consider the case a = b > 0 in which the agent assigns equal and positive weight to the payos of all members of the in-and out-groups alike (i.e. the agent does not perceive any meaningful distinction between the two groups). This corresponds to points along the diagonal in Figure 1 . In this case, the agent would contribute fully to the global public good if a = b > 0.4 for β = 2, or a = b > 0.2 for β = 3. Otherwise, it is optimal to retain the entire endowment in the private account. It follows that, for both values of β in our design, it is only optimal to contribute to the local account if the agent attaches less weight to the payos of members of the out-group than to the in-group, i.e. if b < a.
Hypotheses
Recall that our experiment design has two dimensions. Firstly, we manipulate the values of the other-regarding preference parameters a and b indirectly through our arbitrary, rematched and xed group assignment conditions. Secondly, we vary the return on the global account β directly in our low and high gains from cooperation conditions. In Figure   2 , we summarize the hypothesized eects of our treatments upon these three parameters.
Our rst set of hypotheses are concerned with the eects of our group matching manipulations, operating through the other-regarding preference parameters a and b.
In our arbitrary groups treatment, subjects had no prior interaction with either their inor out-groups before playing the MLPG game. By contrast, in our rematched groups treatments, they had previously interacted with their in-group in the Tullock contest but with a dierent out-group. Finally, in our xed groups treatments subjects had previously interacted with both the same in-and out-groups in the Tullock game.
We hypothesize rstly that, relative to the arbitrary groups condition, a shared experience of conict may strengthen subjects' other-regarding preferences toward members of the in-group, as captured by the parameter a. This corresponds to a rightward movement in Figure 1 , and has the eect of making contribution to the local account more attractive under both rematched and xed groups.
We hypothesize secondly that, relative to rematched groups, a past experience of conict with the same out-group may weaken subjects' other-regarding preferences toward members of the out-group, as captured by the parameter b. This corresponds to a downward movement in Figure 1 , and has the eect of making contribution to the global account less attractive specically under xed groups only.
On the basis of these hypothesized eects, our model implies the following predictions:
Hypothesis 1: Contributions to the local account will be higher under the RL and FL treatments compared to the AL treatment.
Hypothesis 2a: Contributions to the global account will be lower under the FL treatment compared to the RL treatment.
Hypothesis 2b: Contributions to the global account will be lower under the FH treatment compared to the RH treatment.
Our next set of hypotheses are concerned with the second dimension of our experiment design in which we vary the gains from between-group cooperation as captured by the parameter β. It follows directly from equation (4) that an increase in β will increase the marginal benet to contributing to the global account. However, the magnitude of this increase depends also on the value of b, which we have hypothesized above to be attenuated under our xed groups treatments. Accordingly, our model implies that:
Hypothesis 3a: Contributions to the global account will be higher under treatment RH compared to treatment RL.
Hypothesis 3b: Contributions to the global account will be higher under treatment FH compared to treatment FL. However, the magnitude of this increase will be smaller than under rematched groups.
Results
In with respect to earnings is identical to the ranking with respect to global contributions, 6 We report our analysis of the Tullock contest in Section 5.3 and Appendix Figure A1 . 7 Appendix Figure A2 depicts the time paths of mean individual allocations to the private, local and global accounts for each of the ve treatments. It is clear that the ranking of the treatments with respect to the level of contributions to each of the accounts is fairly stable over the ten rounds of the MLPG game, and there are no obvious dierences in either the nature or slope of the time trends across treatments. For these reasons, we aggregate the data from all ten rounds throughout our analysis. 8 We acknowledge that in treatments with rematched groups, the group pairs are not strictly speaking independent observations. This is because subjects have previously interacted with members of a dierent out-group in the rst-stage Tullock contest, and this could potentially result in inter-dependencies in behavior across two group pairs. Note: standard deviations in parentheses. Note: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05.
even though the treatments dier with respect to the eciency of the global public good, and there is also the opportunity to contribute to the less ecient local account.
In Table 2 , we report two-sided p-values for Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of the equality of contributions, to each of the three accounts, in each pairwise comparison between treatments highlighted by our hypotheses. Again, this analysis treats the mean contribution of each group pair by all six subjects and in all ten rounds as a single observation.
Finally, in Table 3 we report an individual-level regression analysis of the eects of our treatments upon individual contributions to each of the three accounts. For each of the 300 subjects, we compute the mean amount allocated by that subject to each account over the ten rounds of the MLPG game. We regress these mean contributions on a set of dummies for each of the treatments, in a two-limit Tobit model with treatment AL as the omitted category. Each subject contributes one observation to each of the three regressions, and we report robust standard errors clustered at the level of group pairs. Table 3 also reports two-sided p-values for tests of the equality of the coecients for each of the pairwise comparisons between treatments highlighted by our hypotheses.
On the basis of these analyses, we report our main results in the following two subsections. Notes: base category AL; robust standard errors clustered by group pairs. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Eects of group matching
Our rst two hypotheses are concerned with the eects of our arbitrary, xed and rematched groups manipulations, and correspond to the horizontal dimension in Figure   2 . We summarize the eects of this dimension of our experiment design graphically in Figure 3 , separately for each of the three accounts, and for treatments with low and high gains from cooperation. The condence bars in this gure represent ±1 standard error of the mean, treating group pairs as observations.
Hypothesis 1 states that subjects' other-regarding preferences toward the members of their in-group may be strengthened when they have had the shared experience of playing the Tullock contest together. As a result, we expect contributions to the local public good to be higher under treatments RL and FL compared to treatment AL.
Both the graphical presentation in Figure 3 as well as the summary statistics in Table 1 conrm that our results are directionally consistent with these predictions: contributions to the local account are highest under FL (15.0%) followed by RL (10.1%) and AL (7.7%) .
This comes at the expense of allocations to the private account, which are higher under AL (59.2%) than RL (48.3%) and FL (46.4%). Tables 2 and 3 indicate that the dierence in contributions to the local account between FL and AL is statistically signicant at the 5% level both in a nonparametric test at the level of group pairs, as well as in the individuallevel regression.
9 On the other hand, none of the dierences between treatments RL and 9 The osetting dierence in allocations to the private account is also signicant at the 5% level in the rank-sum test in Table 2 , although it is only marginally signicant at the 10% level in the regression model of Table 3 . AL are signicant in any of the analyses.
In interpreting these results, we acknowledge that the comparison between treatments FL and AL is not as clean as the one between RL and AL. Since subjects in FL also previously competed with the same out-group in the Tullock contest, the dierences that we observe may also reect an eect of negative sentiment toward the out-group as implied by Hypothesis 2. We summarize our discussion of Hypothesis 1 as follows:
Result 1: Contributions to the local public good are signicantly higher under treatment FL compared to AL. Subjects are more cooperative toward the members of their in-group when they have previously jointly competed against the same out-group, compared to when they have not previously interacted with the members of either group. This result likely reects a combination of in-and out-group eects.
Hypothesis 2 states that subjects' other-regarding preferences toward the members of their out-group may be weakened when they have previously competed against the same out-group in the Tullock contest. As a result, we expect contributions to the global public good to be lower under treatment FL compared to RL, as well as in FH compared to RH.
Once again, both Figure 3 and Table 1 However, when the gains from cooperation are large, the costs are more substantial:
average earnings drop from 219.6 under RH (out of a maximum of 300 in high gains 10 In addition, allocations to the private account are higher in FH compared to RH, and this dierence is marginally signicant at the 10% level in the individual-level regression model. treatments, implying an eciency of 73.2%) to 192.7 (64.2%). It turns out that the eciency of the FH treatment is the lowest out of our ve treatments. In an OLS regression, analogous to the Tobit models in Table 3 , in which we regress each subject's mean earnings over the ten rounds of the MLPG game on dummies for each of the treatments, with standard errors clustered at the level of group pairs, we nd the dierence in earnings between FH and RH to be signicant with p = 0.047. 11 We also nd this dierence to be marginally signicant in a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, with p = 0.070.
Result 2:
When the gains to cooperation between groups are large, contributions to the global public good are signicantly lower under treatment FH compared to RH.
Subjects are less cooperative toward the members of their out-group when they have previously competed against that group, compared to when their previous interaction was with a dierent out-group. As a result of this out-group bias, subjects attain signicantly lower levels of earnings and eciency.
One potential concern with our interpretation of these group matching eects is that experience of the Tullock contest could be informative to subjects regarding the preferences of both in-and out-group members, and this could inuence behavior in the MLPG game independently of the hypothesized eects upon their preferences. In particular, subjects in the xed matching treatments might form more accurate beliefs as a result of having previously interacted with both their in-and out-groups. In this event, we might expect dierences between treatments to decrease over the ten rounds of the MLPG game, as subjects in the rematched groups treatments learn the preferences of their new out-group.
However, as can be seen from Appendix Figure A2 , this is not what we observe: the differences between treatments in contributions to the local and global public goods remain stable over time, with all treatments displaying very similar time trends.
Eects of gains from cooperation
Our nal hypothesis is concerned with the eects of our low versus high gains from cooperation manipulation, and corresponds to the vertical dimension in Figure 2 . We summarize these eects graphically in Figure 4 , separately for each of the three accounts, and for treatments with rematched and xed groups. Once again, the condence bars in this gure represent ±1 standard error of the mean, treating group pairs as observations. Hypothesis 3 states that an increase in the return on contributions to the global public good, representing the magnitude of potential gains from cooperation with the outgroup, will increase the attractiveness of contributing to the global account. However, 11 Full results are available upon request. the response to this increase depends also on the strength of subjects' other-regarding preferences toward their out-group, which are also hypothesized to be weakened when the two groups have previously competed in the Tullock contest. Accordingly, we expect contributions to the global public good to be higher under treatment RH compared to RL.
We also expect global contributions to be higher under FH compared to FL, however we expect this latter eect to be smaller in comparison to the rematched groups treatments.
Both Figure 4 and Table 1 conrm that our results are directionally consistent with these predictions: contributions to the global account are higher both under RH (58.5%) compared to RL (41.6%), as well as under FH (44.5%) compared to FL (38.6%). Moreover, the dierence under rematched groups (16.9%) is almost three times larger than under xed groups (5.9%). As a result, Tables 2 and 3 indicate that under rematched groups, the dierence in contributions to the global account between RH and RL is statistically signicant at the 5% level both in a nonparametric test at the level of group pairs, as well as in the individual-level regression.
On the other hand, under xed groups the dierence in global contributions between FH and FL is not signicant in either of the analyses. Thus when there is a prior history of conict between the two groups, subjects appear to be largely unmoved by an increase in the return to cooperating with the out-group.
Result 3: Contributions to the global public good are signicantly higher under treatment RH compared to RL. Subjects respond to an increase in the return to cooperating with the out-group when the two groups have not previously interacted.
However, when the two groups have previously competed against one another, there is no signicant response.
Finally, we note one result not predicted by our model: contributions to the local public good are higher under FL compared to FH, and this dierence is clearly signicant at the 5% level in the Wilcoxon test, and at the 1% level in the regression analysis.
Tullock contest
Since our group matching treatments were intended to manipulate subjects' experience of conict, we now verify that the Tullock games were indeed keenly contested. Appendix Figure A1 plots the mean individual proposed investment in the group contest fund for each round of the Tullock game.
12 In our design, the actual investment that was binding on each subject is the median of the amounts proposed by the three members of their in-group; Figure A1 also plots the mean of this group median.
Recall that each subject has an endowment of 100 in each round, and that the risk-neutral Nash investment at the individual level is 25. Figure A1 indicates that the mean proposed investments are substantially higher, and typically around double the Nash level. Further, the group medians are on average very close to the individual means, indicating that the high mean proposals are not driven by outlying group members. There is no discernible time trend in the level of contest investments over time, and in particular there is no evidence of convergence toward the Nash investment.
To give an indication of the extent of heterogeneity in the intensity of conict in dierent group pairs, we compute the mean of the six individual proposals within each group pair, and depict the inter-quartile range of these means with respect to the forty group pairs as the shaded region in Figure A1 . This conrms that while there are indeed dierences in the intensity of conict between group pairs, even the comparatively less competitive group pairs nonetheless invest at substantially higher than the Nash level.
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that competition does indeed make group membership more salient than arbitrary group identity in a laboratory setting. Contributions to the local account are signicantly higher in the FL treatment compared to AL (Result 1). Interestingly, while the eect is directionally the same when comparing RL to AL, the dierence is not statistically signicant. Since decisions in the FL treatment are aected by preferences toward both in-and out-group members, the dierence in allocations to the local account in FL compared to AL may be driven in part by a decrease in generosity toward an out-group with whom one has previously been in conict (i.e. a decrease in b in equation 4, as well as an increase in a).
Another intriguing possibility is that dierent preferences for cooperation with the ingroup may be activated when continuing to interact with the same out-group as in the contest. In terms of our model, the increase in a following conict may be dependent on whether the in-group interacts with the same, or a dierent, out-group. Either of these mechanisms would suggest that inter-group competition is a useful tool for inducing salient group identity in economic experiments: the Tullock contest produced behavior that diered signicantly from arbitrary group identity. This opens the possibility of using this, or other, forms of inter-group competition to examine questions relating to group identity in economic experiments.
While we observe greater cooperation within groups following conict, there are substantial negative eects on eciency as a result of reduced cooperation between groups when the MLPG game is played with the same out-group as the Tullock game. In our high returns from cooperation condition, contributions to the global account are lower in treatment FH where the groups previously competed against one another compared to RH (Result 2). Moreover, in our xed-matching condition we nd no signicant increase in allocations to the global account in treatment FH compared to FL. On the other hand, allocations to the global public good increase signicantly in the corresponding rematched-groups treatments (Result 3), which is consistent with previous research on the MLPG game using milder forms of group identity (Blackwell and McKee, 2003; Fellner and Lünser, 2008) . Taken together, these results indicate that the ndings of the previous studies may not be robust to the form of the group identity manipulation.
The muted response to higher returns from cooperation in our xed matching treatments has important implications for naturally-occurring conict. In our experiment, conict in the Tullock contest is socially inecient. However in other settings, competition may help to achieve socially ecient outcomes. For example, in a laboratory experiment Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) nd that among several schemes commonly used by employers to incentivize workers, creating competition among teams is the most ecient (see also Guillen et al., in press ). However, if conict also decreases the potential for teams to cooperate with each other in future, the overall eect of incentivizing intergroup competition may well be negative. As a result of their prior history of competition, changes in preferences toward (or beliefs about) members of a formerly-competing team may impede future cooperation, resulting in lower prots for the rm in the long run.
Behavior in public good games has been explained by several mechanisms, including altruism (Andreoni, 1990) , aversion to inequality (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) , preferences for social eciency (Charness and Rabin, 2002) and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) .
Our model is agnostic on which of these mechanisms drives the eects that we observe, in the sense that one or more of these forces may be responsible for shifting the reduced-form utility weights, a and b, that an individual attaches to the payos of others. Moreover, while our results are consistent with previous research showing that group identity aects both in-and out-group preferences, the form of conict that we introduce in our design, namely competition over a xed resource, may operate through distinct behavioral channels to other forms of salient group identity.
While more research is needed to explore this issue, our ndings are also broadly consistent
with eld experiments such as Gumen (2012) and Buchan et al. (2009) who nd ingroup biases in similar designs using naturally-occurring group identities, as well as with previous work suggesting a link between parochialism and violent conict (Choi and Bowles, 2007; Voors et al., 2012; Bauer et al., 2014) . The fact that we nd a similar eect in a neutrally-framed laboratory setting suggests that the mere act of competition over a xed-resource increases in-group bias, even in the absence of underlying ethnic divisions, cultural stereotyping, or exposure to violence.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present the results of a laboratory experiment in which we manipulate the nature of subjects' prior exposure to conict, to study its eects upon subsequent cooperation both within and between groups. Our design introduces a novel method to induce a stronger form of group identity in the lab, which enables us to disentangle the role of conict in strengthening in-group identity from its eect in changing preferences towards an out-group. We also examine the response to changes in the returns to intergroup cooperation when there has been a past history of conict between the groups.
We nd that group identity is indeed strengthened by exposure to the Tullock contest, and that subjects demonstrate stronger in-group preferences when there has been a shared history of conict between the in-and out-groups. We also nd that prior exposure to conict involving a specic out-group matters independently of the common in-group experience of conict. Moreover, we nd no response to an increase in the returns to between-group cooperation when there has been a previous history of conict involving the same out-group. This neatly demonstrates how inter-group conict even in the setting of a laboratory experiment can lead to less socially ecient outcomes.
Our results are consistent with a simple model in which an individual's other-regarding preferences are sensitive to group identity, such that increases in the material payos of in-group members may be weighted more heavily than corresponding increases in the payos of the out-group. We nd that a shared experience of conict with one's in-group increases the weight attached to in-group payos, while a history of conict involving a specic out-group decreases the utility of out-group payos. This implies that conict increases parochialism both by increasing preferences for in-group cooperation, and also by decreasing preferences for out-group cooperation.
Our ndings are also consistent with those of several eld experiments using naturallyoccurring group identity and conict. The fact that we observe similar eects suggests that competition itself plays a role in forming group identity, independent of more deeplyseated sources of group aliation and conict. 
General instructions
Welcome to this session. From now on, please do not talk to the other participants, or communicate with them in any other way. Mobile phones must also be switched o. If you have a question, please raise your hand and one of us will come to you and assist you in private. These rules are important. If you break any of these rules, we will cancel the session and dismiss all of you without any payment.
In this experiment you will make a number of decisions. These instructions explain the decisions that you will make and their consequences. Depending on your decisions you will earn money which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
Throughout the experiment we will record all earnings in tokens. At the end of the session, we will randomly select two decision rounds to count toward your earnings. The tokens that you earn in these two rounds will be converted into Czech crowns at the following exchange rate: 1 token = 1 CZK
First task
This task will consist of 10 rounds. At the end of the session, we will randomly draw a number between 1 and 10 from a bag to select one of these rounds, and you will be paid your earnings from this randomly chosen round.
At the beginning of this task you will be matched with two other randomly selected people in the room, to form a group of three. Your group will play against one of the other groups who will be your opponents. The other members of your group, as well as your opponents, remain the same through all ten rounds of this task. You will not learn who your group members or opponents are, either during or after today's session. Likewise, neither your group members nor opponents will learn of your identity.
In each round your group and your opponents will compete for a prize as we will now explain.
At the beginning of each round, you will be given an endowment of 100 tokens. Each group must decide how many tokens to allocate to its contest fund. This decision is made in the following way. Each group member will be asked to propose a number of tokens to allocate to the contest fund. The computer will then determine the median amount proposed by the three members.
(The median is the middle number of an increasing series of numbers: the median of 1, 2 and 3 is 2; the median of 1, 98 and 100 is 98.) This amount will be automatically deducted from each member's endowment and allocated to the group's contest fund. Any tokens not allocated to the contest fund will be yours to keep. Since each group member must allocate the same amount to the contest fund, each member will end up with the same balance of tokens. Likewise, your opponents will decide how many tokens to allocate to their contest fund in exactly the same way.
After each group has chosen its allocation to the contest fund, the computer will conduct a random draw to determine whether your group or your opponents win the prize. The prize is worth 300 tokens, which is divided equally among the members of the group that wins it (100 for each member). Your group's chances of winning depend on how many tokens are in its contest fund. This works as follows: imagine that each token allocated to the contest fund by your group and by the other group are placed in a bag, and then one token is randomly drawn from this bag. If the token that is drawn belongs to your group, then your group wins the prize. If the token belongs to the other group, then the other group wins the prize. Each group's chances of winning depend on the number of tokens that it has allocated relative to the number of tokens allocated by the other group.
For instance, if your group and your opponents each allocate the same amount to the contest fund, each group has the same number of tokens in the bag and an equal chance of winning (a 1/2 chance). If your group allocates twice as many tokens to its contest fund as your opponents, your group has twice the chances of winning (your group has a 2/3 chance of winning and the other group has a 1/3 chance). Thus, your group's chances of winning increase with the amount that it allocates to the contest fund, and decrease with the amount allocated by your opponents.
If your group allocates nothing and the other group allocates 1 or more tokens, than the other group automatically wins. If neither group allocates anything to the contest fund, then both groups have a 1/2 chance of winning.
After the computer has determined the winner, you will be informed which group won the prize and shown your earnings for that round. Your earnings are equal to your initial endowment of 100 tokens, minus the number of tokens you allocated to the contest fund, plus 100 tokens if your group won the prize. Since each group member must allocate the same number of tokens to the contest fund in each round, each group member's earnings will also be the same in each round.
Second task
This task will again consist of 10 rounds. At the end of the session, we will randomly draw a number between 1 and 10 from a bag to select one of these rounds, and you will be paid your earnings from this randomly chosen round.
For this task, you will again be a member of the same group of three people with whom you were matched in the previous task. This group will now be paired with a second group of three, who were also matched with one another in the previous task, and who we will refer to as the other group. As before, you will never know the identities of any of these people, and they will never know your identity.
The other group will not be the same as the group that was your opponent in the rst task.
At the beginning of each round, you will be given an endowment of 100 tokens. You will be asked to decide how many of these tokens you will allocate to three accounts: Account A, Account B
and Account C. Your total earnings will depend on the amount that you and others allocate to each of the accounts as explained below:
YOUR GROUP OTHER GROUP ACCOUNT B: Each member of your group earns 1/2 for each token allocated by any member of your group.
A A YOU ACCOUNT A: You earn 1 for each token you allocate.
ACCOUNT C:
Each member of both groups earns 1/3 for each token allocated by any member of both groups.
A A A B
Your earnings from Account A Each token that you allocate to Account A will earn one token for you alone. Therefore if you allocate X tokens to Account A, you will earn exactly X tokens from Account A.
No-one other than you earns anything from the tokens you allocate to Account A. Likewise, you will not earn anything from any tokens allocated to Account A by any other person.
Your earnings from Account B
Tokens allocated to Account B only aect the earnings of the three members of your own group.
For every token allocated to Account B, by any member of your group, each member of your group will earn 1/2 tokens, regardless of whether he or she allocated any tokens to Account B.
Your earnings from Account B = 1/2 x (sum of three allocations to Account B)
The earnings from Account B are calculated in the same way for all three members of your group, so all members of your group each receive the same earnings from Account B as you do.
Therefore, all members of your group each benet equally from every token that any member allocates to Account B.
For each token that you allocate to Account A, you earn one token. Suppose that you allocate this to Account B instead. Then the total amount allocated to Account B increases by one token, and your earnings from Account B increase by 1/2 tokens. At the same time, the earnings of the other members of your group also increase by 1/2 tokens each, so the total earnings from Account B for all three group members would increase by 3/2 tokens in total.
Your allocation to Account B therefore increases the earnings of the other two members of your group, and similarly their allocations to Account B also increase your earnings. For each token that another member of your group allocates to Account B, you also earn 1/2 tokens. So, if all 3 members of your group allocate 1 token to Account B, then Account B contains 3 tokens in total, and each group member will receive 3/2 tokens. In total, your group would earn 3 x 3/2 = 9/2 tokens from Account B.
Tokens allocated to Account B only aect the earnings of the members of your own group. They do not aect the earnings of the other group of three with whom your group is matched.
The members of the other group can allocate tokens to their own Account B, and this will not aect the earnings of you or the other members of your own group.
Your earnings from Account C Tokens allocated to Account C aect the earnings of both the three members of your own group, as well as the three members of the other group. For every token allocated to Account C, by any member of either group, each member of both groups will earn 1/3 tokens, regardless of whether he or she allocated any tokens to Account C.
Your earnings from Account C = 1/3 x (sum of six allocations to Account C)
The earnings from Account C are calculated in the same way for all six members of both groups, so all members of both groups each receive the same earnings from Account C as you do.
Therefore, all members of both groups each benet equally from every token that any member of either group allocates to Account C.
For each token that you allocate to Account A, you earn one token. Suppose that you allocate this to Account C instead. Then the total amount allocated to Account C increases by one token, and your earnings from Account C increase by 1/3 tokens.
At the same time, the earnings of the other members of both groups also increase by 1/3 tokens each, so the total earnings from Account C for all six members of both groups would increase by 2 tokens in total.
Your allocation to Account C therefore increases the earnings of the other ve members of both groups, and similarly their allocations to Account C also increase your earnings. For each token that another member of either group allocates to Account C, you also earn 1/3 tokens.
So, if all 6 members of both groups allocate 1 token to Account C, then Account C contains 6 tokens in total, and each member of both groups will receive 2 tokens. In total, both groups would earn 6x2=12 tokens from Account C.
Your total earnings from this task Your earnings = Your own allocation to Account A + 1/2 x (sum of three allocations to Account B) + 1/3 x (sum of six allocations to Account C)
